

CHAPTER 33

MODELS OF GOVERNANCE IN CAMEROON'S PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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33.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the crisis of the 1980s, the Cameroonian public administration has never been very healthy, which has impacted the country's overall performance. As proof, after proudly sporting the status of a heavily indebted poor country with a completion point in 2006, Cameroon relaunched its growth dynamics with difficulty between 2006 and 2016, only to again ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an Extended Credit Facility (ECF).¹

Yet, since 1960 this country, like several others with a similar history, has implemented several reforms that have not, until now, enabled it to get out of the poverty cycle. In this context, the scientific community has often thought up a certain number of terms to indicate the path and status of these countries. In the 1960s, there was the classification of poor countries, developing countries, and developed countries; the 1970s gave us the terms industrialised and semi-industrialised with colorful descriptors like “dragon” and “tiger.” In the 1980s, the concept of emergence appeared as the new standard to distinguish countries that are not developed, but that have made great efforts in relation to their initial development level, notably to increase their growth and their contribution to world trade.

Since then, to be an emerging country is a declared ambition of most African countries,² and this appetite for the label “emergence” could be explained by the hope that it will open the path to development, justifying all the attempts to import governance tools. It seems then that a positive correlation between economic growth and governance is taking shape. Moreover, public practitioners and decision makers agree that the quality of development also depends on the quality of a country's governance. As such, administrative governance and the effectiveness of civil service are important issues.

It must then be said that the concept of governance is multivocal. It refers, among other aspects, to a model of exercising power in a society or in business. The definition chosen for this chapter is that of a mechanism for producing and distributing wealth. It is expressed

through an ideology, one or several models, political theories, or choices and operational tools.

It is then fathomable that the ability of public services to accommodate to the growth of the context is a confined issue. In theory, and in a “unidisciplinary” perspective, it calls to mind the failure of New Public Management (NPM).³ However, of all the arguments stated to explain the failure of NPM through operational tools, it seems to me that the main cause is conceptual weakness. **accurately** it is a matter of ideological incoherence between the values held by the governance model and the values of Cameroonian society.

This chapter thus falls within the framework of conceptual work concerning ideology and values held by various governance models. The following discussion presents, in the first part, the unsuitability of the public administration's governance model to the Cameroonian context. The second part proposes the basis of a renewed governance model based on an ideology more coherent with the requirements of the Cameroonian's environment.

33.2 UNSUITABLE GOVERNANCE MODEL: PREMINENCE OF NEOLIBERAL IDEOLOGY

Cameroon appears as a land of transplantation because of several influences it has received since its independence. Thus it (1) keeps alive in his subconscious traditional governance modes dismantled by the colonial venture; (2) has a double colonial heritage, on the one hand through the principles of civil law (French heritage) and on the other through common law (British heritage); (3) has undergone new changes through structural adjustment programs; (4) has inherited to the NPM, inspired simultaneously by the Canadian experience and the French model. This back-to-back sedimentation of ideologies is a triple consequence of historic, economic, and political events.

It has thus experienced several changes, one of the most important occurring after the economic crisis that lasted for 20 years (1980–2000). After this painful ordeal, and following structural adjustment programs, they undertook to modify its mode of governance, going from means-based management to results-based management. More than a simple semantic difference, this is the introduction of a new ideology into the functioning of the public administration. The objective here is to recall on one hand, the changes and the responses in terms of governance tools and, on the other hand, the limits of the different changes undertaken.

33.3 THE GOVERNANCE MODEL OF THE CAMEROONIAN PUBLIC SERVICE: MAIN CHANGES

The idea of exploring the determinant variables of the governance model in the trajectory of the Cameroonian public administration since independence seems opportune and pertinent. The schema chart below shows the main changes carried out and the corresponding management tools.




FIG. 33.1 A few important dates in the dynamics of the Cameroonian governance model (1960–2007).

It appears that three important ideologies mark this trajectory: the governance model based on Weberian principles, the governance model in the adjustment period, and the governance model based on the NPM principles.

33.3.0.1 *Pre-colonial Governance Models with Communitarian Preeminence*

The first moment of Kamerun's history is the pre-colonial period before 1884, where the community was the primary mode of social regulation. It organized its power relationships around a charismatic chief of a "clan" who defended the interests of his community in its transactions with third parties. This traditional society was based on values such as: solidarity, the importance of filiation, social regulation by the community, and trust.

33.3.0.2 *The Weberian Governance Model*

The second moment of the history of Cameroon, the period between 1960 and 1985, is centered on the principles of the Weberian model where *rules control action*. To better understand the origins of this model, it is important to remember that it was inherited from the colonial period. Cameroon's history shows that it was subjected to three influences,

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British, German, and French, but the consensus seems to be that the French and British predominated.⁴ These were two ideologies that were opposed by their very nature. . They lived together within an environment that also had socio-anthropological specificities very different from those inherited from colonization.

According to historians, the governance models result from colonization policies. On one hand it seems that, before 1939, British operations were regularly managed by a decentralized team of plenipotentiary agents specialized in promoting local political development; and, since 1945, Great Britain has collaborated with recognized national governments through international development aid (Myerson, 2021). The author uses the expression “colonial stabilization” to designate the governance mode of a stable colonial regime that offers basic services to the population. The British mode is based on a decentralized team of agents (called district agents) capable of negotiating effectively with local leaders in the entire country. The intervention logic advocates negotiation and the support of local officials. The strategy is thus to impose their ideology and operational tools through the leaders, the warrantor of the community's interests. In the British governance model, the market has a dominant role; efficiency is ensured by the protection of the investors and the existence of an effective financial market. This model, marked by a momentum of permanent negotiation, seems to present qualities of adaptability and flexibility. However, it is often accused of letting the predatory behavior of investors prosper without controls, which would be harmful without State intervention.

On the other hand, the French model, marked by State control of economic and social activity, is based on civil law, inspired by Roman law. It is often associated with a greater State interventionism. It focuses on legal regulation, making the norm the basis of all public action. Everything is legislated and the law is the warrantor of protecting the general interest. This model is considered ineffective in protecting the interests of private investors.. Although some see disadvantages in it, notably the corruption of those governing, a top-heavy bureaucracy, centralization of power, low effectiveness, and in a certain measure a reduction of political liberty (La Porta et al., 1999), others see qualities: those of the role of protector of the colonial empire, thus subjecting all colonial actors to the central power of the mother country. This would avoid the emergence of strong individuals to the detriment of the mother country and its interests. This reality is conditioned by the ability to enforce judicial decisions.

In a comparative perspective, the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common law is theoretically opposed to that of civil law. While the French system relies on professional judges and the requirement to legislate in order to frame decisions, the British system is composed of non-professional juries, law is not codified, and the procedure is oral (Charreaux, 2004). The former is characterized by the preeminence of the market as a mode to regulate society; the latter recognizes the domination of the State.

Cameroon inherited these two governance models with different foundations at its independence in 1960. Whether it is a matter of the English-speaking regions called Anglophone today (North-West and South-West) or the regions called Francophone or regions), the difficulty is the same: the traditional mode of governance had to be supplanted by the imported regime, British or French. The two public services were deployed simultaneously and, for the benefit of the reunification process of the two zones, Cameroon progressively adopted a single, predominantly French governance model. This was the Weberian model (Weber,

1978).⁵ It is characterized by the division of labor; the establishment of a clearly defined hierarchy; precise rules and norms; the formal selection of members; and an impersonal mode of relationship. Power is centralized and all the regions are subject to the same governance regime, whose principal determinant is legal tradition.

This era corresponds to the post-independence period whose objective was to build a State and be part of the development perspective. The “transplant” theory (Berkowitz et al., 1999) that justifies borrowing the Weberian model teaches us that its effectiveness depends on the country’s ability to adapt to law or of a population becoming accustomed to this law. The governance model of that era enjoyed a relatively stable environment with abundant resources from oil revenues, particularly beginning in 1979. It privileged rigorous planning (i.e., 5-years plans) where the public sector was the development driver. This spread throughout all domains of society through businesses created, notably the National Investment Corporation of Cameroun (NIC). This was not accomplished without clashes.

Absolutely, in both the French and British models, the ideological foundations were far distant from Cameroonian realities whose pre-colonial governance principles relied on communitarian levers, and whose legacy is found in the promotion of principles such as the Cameroonization of jobs, regional balance⁶ for recruitment in public service, locally centered development (distribution of investment projects over the Cameroonian territory in a sequential trend with the objective of developing all the regions non-exclusively). These concerns, in reality, bear the seeds of a communitarian identity totally different from the levers of the French and British models.

While the public administration was concerned with adapting to the constraints of its time, the economic crisis suddenly arrived in 1985. Cameroon lost the sovereignty of its strategic development choices; it was placed under the control of the IMF and embarked on vast adjustment policies.

33.3.0.3 *The Governance Model under the Adjustment Policies*

The third moment of Cameroon’s history is marked by the economic crisis of 1985 to 2006. Public action was controlled by the IMF and the World Bank. The public administration underwent a wave of structural reforms (organization and personnel plan, modification of the structure of ministries), organizational reforms (a national governance plan was developed with the objective of improving the management of the State’s human and institutional resources), and financial reforms (a reform of public finance management was begun).

In this context, the governance model is based on the free-trade leanings of international institutions. Development aid and the various loans granted by creditor countries are conditional on the institution of new management rules. The State privatizes certain companies in order to improve its efficiency. It is agreed that it could no longer be the main investor; in some areas it would have to give way to the market as means of regulating society. The beginnings of a new governance model were set up as a prelude to a way out of the crisis. It took 20 years before the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was adopted in 2003, permitting Cameroon to regain its sovereignty in the area of economic development planning. At the same time, in 2004, Cameroon embarked on modifying the form of the State through decentralization, which was finalized in its constitution of 2006. During the same period, reforms inspired by the NPM model were introduced, a new governance model that proved itself in the US and the West. But, as in the past, this reform movement was again




FIG. 33.2 Marked positioning for NPM since 2007.

to operate in disregard of local concerns, ignoring the substratum and traditional power relationships.

33.3.0.4 *The NPM Era*

The fourth moment marks a decisive positioning toward the NPM philosophy driven by free-market ideology. Transformations are then seen via the reform initiated in public finance management that took shape in 2007. The law on the State's new financial system replaced the Ordinance of 62, then in force in the implementation of the State budget. In 2009, the Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) replaced the PRSP. It was supplemented by seven sectoral strategies and as many strategies of ministerial scope as there are ministries. The philosophy of results-based management was adopted and the budget program guided the implementation of programs in the entire public sector (public administrations, public entities, and decentralized territorial collectivities). Thus, several reforms have been initiated since 2007, as illustrated in Figure 33.2 below.

It seems that the reforms initiated cover all fields of public administration: the management of public finance, land and survey resources, public contracts, human resources, public entities, and decentralization. New concepts are now to be found in the administrative environment: effectiveness, efficiency, pertinence, quality of public spending, alignment of public policy, program, and project. New values are imperative: accountability, transparency, ethics, innovation and openness to change, among others.

In the end, without any regard for traditional values, three imported governance ideologies mark the trajectory of Cameroonians' administration: the British ideology, the Weberian ideology, and the free-market ideology sanctioned by NPM.⁷ This trajectory shows the resolve of the Cameroonians' public administration to adopt the NPM performance culture. However, we see that after 18 years of NPM reforms, the public administration finds it difficult to show a culture of results and performance, which calls into question the effectiveness of NPM.

33.3.1 Limits of the Various Changes Undertaken

The main reason for challenging NPM is the fact that it has not kept its promise of effectiveness, neither in the precursor countries (Boyne et al., 2003), nor during the Cameroonian reforms. In the case of Cameroon, the announced performance in relation to public institutions was not effective and, despite obvious transformations, some postulates on which NPM was based remain dubious.⁸ Thus NPM is theoretically contested for its conceptual, cultural, ethical, and political characteristics, which are judged irreconcilable with the local culture.⁹

The analysis of these failures requires an ideological discussion of the contradictions of the different legal models in force. More specifically, there is a true divergence in the management of power relationships stemming from the two imported governance models that cohabit in the Cameroonians' public administration: the British model largely absorbed by the French model, both ignoring the foundations of communitarian regulation of the Cameroonian society, the French model then dominant in the public service transactions and the community values whose existence is lived. Therefore, in spite of the robustness of the tools of governance carried by the NPM of neoliberal ideology, the incompatibilities, the resistances, and even the knock-back of these tools are felt in the facts. This reality is materialized by the existence of double action, the existence of parallel tools that try to reconcile with the values of the local community. This is the case of tools to regulate community momentum, notably the tool of regional balance, the law on indigenism, or the principal tools of political regulation (for example, of the sociological composition of electoral lists, appointment of the leaders of a community to the executive helm of the regions, etc.).

These are all stereotypes that recall the resistance to the destruction of what Cameroonian society holds sacred: solidarity. To this reality are opposed concepts called "modern," like the contract, the law, the State, individual responsibility, among others. These are realities of modern business inherited from models elsewhere. The ideological conflicts that are reflected in these fundamental differences generate multifaceted dysfunctions, analyzed by authors wearing the glasses of neoliberal rationalities.¹⁰ The resulting criticism dodges anthropological and ideological analysis and concentrates on analyses of the operability of the governance model: a centralization of the activities of the entire organization that is contradictorily introduced at the same time as decentralization (Savoie, 2006b). Some authors note the "agencification" of the public service with an increased complexity of the actors' interrelations (Van Haepelen, 2012). Other criticism emphasizes the organizational authenticity of the public administration and the incompatibility with communitarian values. It should be noted that the growing distrust of NPM stems also from the fact that it is rooted in various economic approaches and theories where "traditional" qualitative and

normative values (Kernaghan, 2000) are supplanted by efficiency values through the prism of NPM, whose unstable and fleeting character is emphasized by Bozeman (2007).¹¹ In this context, professionalization is seen as an asset (Zaoudi, 2021).

Even when the analysis adopts cultural logic, it doesn't refer to ideological concerns but is in comparison with the performance of the private sector. And yet the culturalist approach raises the relevant question of political production and the indifference of NPM. This management ideology, in turning the citizen into a client, encourages indifference and transforms the relations between the State and the citizens into a sort of service relationship. The semantic and policy shift thus operated would promote exacerbated individualism, a postmodern self-absorption, narcissism set up as a moral doctrine, and monadism as the main values, this to the mischief of strengthening the ethics of fellow citizenship, fraternity, or solidarity (Piron, 2003). It would also depreciate the nobility of public service on the pretext of transforming public servants into entrepreneurs (Savoie, 2006a).

Overall, the main difficulties raised by the authors barely hide the difficulty of adapting imported models to the African, particularly Cameroonian, cultural context. That is what explains the call on various different tools, incoherent, incompatible, and counter-productive, and invites us to consider a new governance model more coherent with endogenous requirements.

33.4 TOWARD A NEW GOVERNANCE MODEL

Thinking about a new governance model raises the question of conceptual compatibility, the chief cause of the weakness of the Cameroonian State administration. The examples of NPM success in Singapore and Malaysia make a case for this presumption.

Singapore,¹² often presented as a successful case of NPM, owes the success of its reforms to the support of the business world, professional groups, foreign investors, and State agents (Samaratunge et al., 2008). This is a remarkable difference from the other experiences in which the reforms were conducted either in a top-down model or by building on coercive normative corpuses, or else only on the administrative elite.¹³ This is equally the case with Malaysia, which created a positive partnership with State agents¹⁴ in order to improve administrative responsibility and ensure the continued success of innovative programs and policies able to improve the quality of public service. The difference seems to be established at the level of stakeholders' participation, particularly the support of the most influential local actors. The success in these countries is therefore dependent on coherence with cultural, ethical, and political characteristics, thus compatible with administrative culture. Hence the interest of the proposed governance model (II.1) and the importance of its components (II.2).

33.4.1 The Ideology Underpinning the Proposed Governance Model

The model proposed is based on two premiss. The first is that every tool holds and conveys an ideology whose coherence with its implantation environment guarantees success. The

second postulate suggests having a management style of assessing governance tools. Indeed, unlike the economists who consider that it is enough to have a tool that works well for it to be effective,¹⁵ for managers a tool is a living element, which needs an environment suitable for its use. It is therefore advisable to look at the ideological underpinnings of these governance tools.

In the case of the Cameroonian State administration, there is a serious ideological contradiction between the governance model currently in force and the values of society. Here the State is torn between the need for the effectiveness of these instruments and the social expectations for which the collective unconscious makes of it a communitarian social organization. The governance model must establish itself between these two imperatives. In this context, it would be good to abandon the free-market tendency and to re-energize with African communitarian values while incorporating three dimensions of the current public service modernization issues, concerning chiefly: (i) administrative coordination; (ii) participation, collaboration and democratic values within the administration; and (iii) systematic integration of technological advances, principally digitalization. It is at this strategic level that arguments are needed in order to develop the conceptual ideology that should support the governance model to be applied in the Cameroonian's State administration.

For management, the laborer's hand no longer has to adapt material to shape it, but the man has to adapt to managerial instructions and permanent changes (Rappin, 2018). The issue here in the imported management practices comes back to the need to ensure coherence between these practices and those of the host society through "endogenization" processes mobilizing the participation of all stakeholders. This option is supported by the obvious fact that all sciences have an ideological path and all management tools reflect this ideology. The public administration must therefore be brought to what it ought to be in the sense of the social contract.

On this issue, the communitarian nature of Cameroonian society opposes the free-market values held by the governance model and tools in force. So, a model must be invented that comes as close as possible to communitarian values and modernity's requirements of effectiveness. This proposal has the merit of raising the cultural problems linked to the introduction of management models and of introducing the questions of cultural and civilizational authenticity that increasingly arise in discussions on administrative reforms. These problems refer to issues of ownership of the borrowed models in the administrations.

Absolutely, opening up to cultural regulation makes it possible to understand governance according to a model different from the classic economic model fueled by the characteristics of the neoliberal American environment. The Cameroonian environment, like that of several African countries, is characterized by the existence of a management that is ethno-cultural in essence. In this context, paternalism is often highlighted (Hernandez, 1997) or the "circulation model" (Mutabazi, 2006). The hypothesis adopted here is that the environment is neither neutral nor indifferent in relation to the functioning of the public administration. It is not a matter of setting our considerations in the polarity of "all Western" or "all African" but of suggesting that Cameroonian specificities be considered in the governance model applied. To be more precise, one could draw on the levers of African culturalist ideology as the foundation of the governance model of the public administration.

The ideology considered here departs from neoliberal precepts. It is characterized by an intercultural management of proximity. The collective discipline that distinguishes it mobilizes control mechanisms, cutting across social relations and communitarian networks. It

thus clearly appears that a *homo africanus* exists (Biwolé-Fouda et al., 2018). Indeed, there truly exists an African rationality buried in seemingly irrational transactions or ambiguous forms of rationality. The idea that the African mode of governance is necessarily failing is thus counterintuitive. In this sense, Ahouanougan et al. (2010) argue that so-called informal practices in Africa are responses to the often social needs of persons not formally taken care of. This, moreover, allows Dia (1991) to assert that African management is characterized by a traditional mode of leadership in the sense that the leader acts in the name of a group from which he or she originates and ensures that the group's interests are defended. For that matter, Tannery (2019) brings to light a few variables of the African governance model, drawing on the functioning of Cameroon, Gabon, and Rwanda. His analysis shows that this model concentrates specificities, such as social embedding that prevails over the economic, thus conditioning the administration's way of functioning.¹⁶ In some cases, an impression of the primacy of chance over technical reasoning and a reference to religion¹⁷ or tradition deflect attention from the rationalities described in the laws and provisions inherited from the English or the French. Consequently, even though public sector organizations exist, they alone do not contribute to regulation and decision-making. They are supplemented, even in some cases dominated by ethnic or communitarian forms of regulation. Thus, administrative decisions, although regulated by formal laws, are not made only on the basis of technical and economic criteria. The African governance model ought then to respond to the exigencies of its social environment and, from this point of view, would be more useful.

33.4.2 Proposed Governance Model and Discussion

Each of the governance models has advantages and disadvantages. In other words, each governance model is effective under precised conditions. The coexistence of at least three governance models in the Cameroonian administration opens up the discussion of the hybridization of the governance models. Even though Hirigoyen and Poulain-Rehm (2017) do not exclude the idea of the coexistence of a plurality of governance models considering the importance of institutional differences, they do not exclude either the hypothesis of a hybridization of governance systems by combining elements taken from distinct models. There then remains the question of the preeminence of certain variables whose domination would make it possible to give meaning to administrative action.

It should be recalled that governance is a mechanism for producing and distributing wealth that is expressed through an ideology, one or several models, political theories or choices, and operational tools. Approaching the question of a new governance model in a context of hybridization means identifying the variables that are worth placing at the heart of this mechanism of negotiation and social contract. Convinced that the governance model, based on neoliberal values, would contradict African values, I suggest looking at local practices. In this way we can learn how collective conventions, which ensure society's functioning and which must work together within the public administration, are used and established. The proposed governance model should address the questions of participation, collaboration, administrative justice, and digitalization, in accordance with the issues and cultural values of Cameroonian society.

In this case, Mutabazi's circulation model (2006) emerges as a system of reference suitable to be proposed as a new governance model in Cameroon. It is inspired by the way African

society was organized before contact with the West¹⁸ and serves as methodological support for formulating the proposal of a new governance model for the Cameroonian public sector. The basic postulate of this model is that African cultural unity transcends its diversity. The cultural base that underlies this option is a belief in a superior power above all religions and all traditional cultures. There is thus a difference between this model and the neoliberal capitalistic model: the group and the family take precedence over the individual; age, or more exactly old age is not considered a decline; and words spoken and direct exchange are more valued than words written.

The circulation model is rooted in parenthood; the organization by clans and ethnic groups illustrates this. A clan or an ethnic group can total more than 1,000 persons. There are also connections between clans. In the Cameroonian State administration, there are tools that convey this ideology: the text on regional balance (distribution of quotas by region) used for public sector examinations and often appealed to in order to justify certain appointments to high positions of responsibility. This identity anchoring is one of the fundamental characteristics of governance in the Cameroonian public sector. The circulation model takes this reality into account through various types of circulation whose object is to link together the members of the community in ensuring their survival and their cohesion: the circulation of goods and people, the circulation of human energy, the circulation of power, and the circulation of information.

As regards the circulation of goods and people, it is maintained by gifts and counter-gifts and visits to clan members. For that matter, public sector networks emerge around the highest-ranking person in the public administration in each region, a representative of the clan and “kingmaker.” Being connected to the clan is thus a guarantee of survival, for promotions are made and recognized thanks to the clan; community members depend on each other to solve their problems and satisfy their daily concerns.

The organization of power recognizes a certain verticality between older and younger people, between superiors and subordinates. In this context, the old are valued (because of their experience) in the same way as chiefs.¹⁹ In this regard, the administrative elite commit to protecting their clan’s interests. We are accustomed to the terms “personal representative of the Head of State,” “personal representative of the Prime Minister or of a minister.” These representations are the proof that the communities attribute to the administrative elites the responsibility of the defense of the interests of their clans. This apparently insignificant practice sanctions the identity anchoring of society. The appointment of a son of the clan is celebrated by the whole clan and a motion of support is addressed to the Head of State. Very often the first signatory of this motion is the highest-ranking official of the clan, followed by the names of the entire clan, most often in order of precedence.

The circulation of information is a method of keeping the members of the clan in permanently connected. It is around this tradition that the clan’s problems are resolved and its future prospects considered. In the public administration, clans express their solidarity or their inter-clan struggles in various ways.

These illustrations contrast with the principles of individual responsibility. The community constitutes a determinant variable currently implicit in the administration’s governance model. The innovation of my proposal resides in the modalities of participation, collaboration, and administrative coordination. They think of taking the community into account as an effective reference point in the selection of the administrative elite (legitimacy of

the people chosen) as well as in their involvement in the different conventions within the administration.

In concrete terms, this entails building the criteria of public agents' legitimacy, combining both competence criteria and those of social legitimacy. Competition between regions requires the design of appropriate management tools. Co-option based on real or potential service records expected by society could be an applicable tool. In other places, this co-option is done through recommendations (in Canada this is an affirmed legitimacy tool). Likewise, the modes of collaboration and participation could build on existing communitarian frameworks.

33.5 CONCLUSION

The failure of reforms undertaken in the Cameroonian public administration in the past almost 18 years can be explained by the use of a governance mode out of step with the values of society. Indeed, NPM conveys neo-liberal ideological values. These are the opposite of the communitarian cultural characteristics that govern relations within Cameroonian society. Thus, we see an ideological layering creating a chronic identity blurring and an ineffectiveness that has been decried for years. Hence the proposal of a new governance model based on Mutabazi's circulation model. The new governance model should include communitarian principles and values such as power verticality between old and young; the preeminence of the group over the individual; collective responsibility; and social legitimacy. This proposal, however, is partial and must continue to be explored, necessitating in-depth study with additional contributions. In this context, further research will enable me to position the model within a well-structured ideology with four elements of coherence. On one hand, it must be backed by an *economic theory* and a *political ideology* and, on the other, it must propose a *paradigm of public policy* and elements of a *social imaginary*.

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